FCC收窄并修订外国产并网型联网电力逆变器Covered List范围

DA 26-870
Released: August 20, 2026
FOLLOWING NEW NATIONAL SECURITY DETERMINATION, FCC ANNOUNCES
MODIFICATION OF POWER INVERTERS ENTRY ON THE COVERED LIST
WC Docket No. 18-89, ET Docket No. 21-232, EA Docket No. 21-233
The Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC or Commission) Public Safety and Homeland
Security Bureau (PSHSB) maintains a list of equipment and services (Covered List) that have been
determined to “pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and
safety of United States persons.”1 Pursuant to Section 2 of the Secure and Trusted Communications
Networks Act of 2019 (Secure Networks Act)2 and Sections 1.50002(a) and 1.50003 of the Commission’s
rules,3 PSHSB announces that the Department of War (DoW) has made the following determinations:
First, DoW has determined that certain foreign‑produced power inverters that are eligible for certain
clean energy tax credits do not pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States or to
the safety and security of U.S. persons. Second, DoW has determined that the definition of “power
inverters” should be revised to accurately reflect the specific power inverters that the Executive Branch
interagency body and the DoW previously determined to pose unacceptable risks to the national security
of the United States or to the security and safety of U.S. persons.4 The Commission has also updated its
FAQ page accordingly.5
Addition of Foreign-Produced Inverters to Covered List
On July 28, 2026, PSHSB added power inverters produced in a foreign country to the Covered
List.6 This action was based on a National Security Determination from an Executive Branch interagency
body, including several appropriate national security agencies, determining (among other things) that
1 Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, Pub. L. No. 116-124, 133 Stat. 158 (2020) (codified
as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1609) (Secure Networks Act); 47 CFR §§ 1.50002, 1.50003. For the current
version of the Covered List, see Federal Communications Commission (FCC), List of Equipment and Services
Covered By Section 2 of The Secure Networks Act, https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist (last updated Aug.
20, 2026).
2 47 U.S.C. § 1601.
3 47 CFR §§ 1.50002(a), 1.50003; see also Protecting Against National Security Threats to the Communications
Supply Chain Through FCC Programs, WC Docket No. 18-89, Second Report and Order, 35 FCC Rcd 14284
(2020) (Supply Chain Second Report and Order).
4 See Appendix B.
5 FAQs on Recent Updates to FCC Covered List Regarding Foreign-Produced Advanced Robotic Devices and
Power Inverters (last updated Aug. 20, 2026), https://www.fcc.gov/covered-list-faqs-robots-inverters.
6 See FCC, FCC’s Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Announces Addition of Foreign-Produced Power
Inverters and Advanced Robotic Devices to FCC Covered List, WC Docket No. 18-89, ET Docket No. 21-232, EA
Docket No. 21-233, Public Notice, DA 26-786 (PSHSB July 28, 2026) (July 2026 Power Inverters PN).

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power inverters produced in a foreign country pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the
United States and to the safety and security of U.S. persons (First Power Inverter National Security
Determination). In the Public Notice, we stated, “If we receive a further specific determination from
DoW or DHS that a given power inverter . . . , or class of such devices, does not pose unacceptable risks,
we will further update the Covered List.”7
Second Power Inverter National Security Determination
On August 19, 2026, the Commission received another National Security Determination from
DoW that contains additional determinations in follow-up to the First Power Inverter National Security
Determination.8
Advanced Manufacturing Tax Credit. The Second Power Inverter National Security
Determination has determined that “certain foreign-produced power inverters that are eligible for certain
clean energy tax credits do not pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States and to
the safety and security of U.S. persons.”9 Among other things, the Second Power Inverter National
Security Determination states:
“The One Big Beautiful Bill Act . . . modified and established certain
conditions on access to the Advanced Manufacturing Tax Credit for
domestic production of certain energy-related components (codified at 26
U.S.C. § 45X)(section 45X).10 Specifically, section 45x(c)(1)(C) prevents
any ‘eligible component’ (including certain power inverters) from
including any property which includes any material assistance from a
prohibited foreign entity (as defined in section 7701(a)(52)).’11 The
United States Congress and President Trump, as part of the Trump
Administration’s efforts to reshore and secure critical supply chains,
through The One Big Beautiful Bill Act clearly determined that foreign-
produced power inverters that comply with section 45X should be eligible
for a tax credit for domestic production. Therefore, President Trump and
the United States Congress determined that such power inverters should
be considered domestically-produced.”12
As a result, DoW has “determine[d] that foreign-produced power inverters that are eligible for the
section 45X tax credit do not pose the unacceptable security risks identified in the First Power Inverter
National Security Determination and should be removed from the FCC’s Covered List as not ‘foreign-
produced.’”13
7 July 2026 Power Inverters PN, at 3.
8 The second Power Inverters National Security Determination is attached as Appendix B to this Public Notice
(Second Power Inverter National Security Determination).
9 Second Power Inverter National Security Determination at 1.
10 Id. at 1 (citing The One Big Beautiful Bill Act, Pub. L. No. 119-21, 70514, 139 Stat. 72 (2025) (codified at 26
U.S.C. § 45X).
11 Second Power Inverter National Security Determination at 1-2 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 45X(d)(4)(A)).
12 Second Power Inverter National Security Determination at 2.
13 Id. at 2.

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Type of Power Inverters Covered. In this Second Power Inverter National Security
Determination, DoW has also determined that “pursuant to the First Power Inverter National Security
Determination and the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act, 47 U.S.C. § 1601(c)(4), that
the definition of ‘power inverters’ should be revised to accurately reflect which foreign-produced power
inverters the Executive Branch interagency body and the DoW have determined to pose unacceptable
risks to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons.”14
The DoW notes that “[t]he First Power Inverter National Security Determination concerned foreign-
produced power inverters that ‘[c]ontain[ed] components that enable remote communication, control,
sensing, data collection, or monitoring through WiFi, cellular, Bluetooth, or other similar connection.’”15
DoW states that “the interagency body, including DoW, interpret the term ‘similar connection’ to include
components with wired connectivity and understand the First Power Inverter National Security
Determination to have included power inverters designed, equipped, or configured to contain these
connected components.”16 DoW states that, “[f]or the avoidance of doubt, DoW determines that power
inverters that contain, or are designed, equipped, or configured to accept, a component that enables
remote communication, control, sensing, data-collection, or monitoring through Ethernet or other similar
connections pose the same unacceptable risks described in the First Power Inverter National Security
Determination as power inverters with wireless connectivity.”17 The DoW states that “[t]hese
unacceptable risks include: (i) facilitating a supply chain vulnerability that could disrupt U.S. economic
security, including sectors critical to national security, and (ii) creating a cybersecurity risk that threatens
the security of critical infrastructure and the safety of U.S. persons.”18
Additionally, in the Second Power Inverter National Security Determination, DoW also has
determined that certain classes of power inverters do not pose unacceptable risks to the national security
of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons and should be removed from the
FCC’s Covered List.19 DoW states that “[t]hese classes of power inverters are those that are not
electronic devices that ‘change[] dc power to ac power, to include bidirectional devices, that is intended
for use in parallel with an electric utility to supply common loads and sometimes deliver power to the
utility, i.e. a utility-interactive inverter as that term is defined in UL 1741 [Underwriter Laboratories
Standard UL 1741, Inverters, Converters, Controllers and Interconnection System Equipment for Use
with Distributed Energy Resources] sections 2.1.23, 2.1.52.’”20 DoW has determined that “power
inverters described in the First Power Inverter National Security Determination, but which do not meet
the definition set forth in UL 1741, do not pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United
States or the security and safety of United States person.”21 DoW additionally states that “[p]ower
inverters that are incapable of connection to the utility grid (i.e., non-utility-interactive inverters)
generally do not pose risk to the public utility grid” and that “[t]he risk of such power inverter systems is
thus limited to local impacts which can generally be managed on a local system level and do not threaten
the interconnected power system.”22
The DoW concludes that, in light of the above determinations, that:
14 Id.at 1.
15 Id.at 2.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 2 (citing First Power Inverter National Security Determination).
18 Id. at 2.
19 Id. at 3.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.

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“the FCC should include on its Covered List only foreign-produced power
inverters that are defined to be an electronic device that:
(a) Changes dc power to ac power, to include
bidirectional devices, that is intended for use in
parallel with an electric utility to supply common
loads and sometimes deliver power to the utility, i.e.,
a utility-interactive inverter as that term is defined in
UL 1741 sections 2.1.23, 2.1.52 and
(b) Contains, or is designed, equipped, or configured to
accept,
a
component
that
enables
remote
communication, control, sensing, data-collection, or
monitoring through Ethernet, Wi-Fi, cellular,
Bluetooth, or other similar connections, whether
wired or wireless.”23
As a result of all these determinations, DoW states that “the FCC should update the Covered List
as it relates to foreign-produced power inverters and amend the definition of power inverter.”24
The Covered List
We find that the Second Power Inverter National Security Determination constitutes a specific
determination of an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security or safety
of United States persons pursuant to section 2 of the Secure Networks Act and the First Power Inverter
National Security Determination.25 First, we find that the Second Power Inverter National Security
Determination constitutes a specific determination that certain foreign-produced power inverters pose an
unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security or safety of United States
persons pursuant to section 2 of the Secure Networks Act, i.e. those that “[c]ontain[], or [are] designed,
equipped, or configured to accept, a component that enables remote communication, control, sensing,
data-collection, or monitoring through Ethernet, Wi-Fi, cellular, Bluetooth, or other similar connections,
whether wired or wireless.”26 Second, we find that this constitutes a specific determination that power
inverters that are eligible for the Advanced Manufacturing Tax Credit in 26 U.S.C. § 45X for domestic
production do not pose unacceptable risks to the national security of the United States or the security or
safety of United States persons, as they should not be considered “foreign-produced.”27 Therefore, we
update the Covered List as follows:
“Foreign-produced power inverters, except power inverters which have
been granted a Conditional Approval by DoW or DHS.”
23 Id. at 3.
24 Id. at 1.
25 47 U.S.C. § 1601(c); First Power Inverter National Security Determination at 2 (reaching a specific determination
pursuant to section 2 of the Secure Networks Act about foreign-produced power inverters, “unless the Department of
War or Department of Homeland Security makes a specific determination to the FCC that a given power inverter or
class of power inverters do not pose such risks.”)
26 Second Power Inverter National Security Determination at 2-3. We read the Second Power Inverter National
Security Determination to both clarify the scope of the First Power Inverter National Security Determination and to
constitute a new such specific determination pursuant to DoW’s authority to make specific determinations under the
Secure Networks Act as an “appropriate national security agency.” See 47 U.S.C. §§ 1601(c)(4), 1608(2).
27 Second Power Inverter National Security Determination at 1-2; First Power Inverter Determination at 2.

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In making this update to the Covered List, we incorporate the definitions of “power inverters” and
“foreign-produced power inverters” as stated in the Second Power Inverter National Security
Determination.28 Specifically, we adopt the following definitions:
•
Power inverters: The term “power inverters” shall mean—
(a) Changes dc power to ac power, to include bidirectional
devices, that is intended for use in parallel with an electric
utility to supply common loads and sometimes deliver power
to the utility, i.e., a utility-interactive inverter as that term is
defined in UL 1741 sections 2.1.23, 2.1.52; and
(b) Contains, or is designed, equipped, or configured to accept, a
component that enables remote communication, control,
sensing, data-collection, or monitoring through Ethernet, Wi-
Fi, cellular, Bluetooth, or other similar connections, whether
wired or wireless.
•
Foreign-produced power inverters: The term “foreign-produced power
inverters” shall mean power inverters as defined above that are not
either—
(a) Eligible for the Advanced Manufacturing Tax Credit in 26
U.S. Code § 45X for domestic production or
(b) A domestic end product as defined in 48 CFR § 25.101(a)
because they are manufactured in the United States and the
cost of domestic components exceeds 65% of the total
component cost for items delivered in calendar years 2024
through 2028 or 75% for items delivered starting in calendar
year 2029.
Conditional Approvals
We reiterate that the Executive Branch interagency body has established a process in which
entities producing power inverters in a foreign country can request an evaluation as to whether their
devices do not pose unacceptable risks to national security and receive Conditional Approvals that would
exempt the devices from the Covered List. DoW or DHS may evaluate such submissions for power
inverters. Entities seeking Conditional Approvals for power inverters must provide the information
requested in the Power Inverters Guidance Document.
If we receive a further specific determination from DoW or DHS that a given power inverter, or
class of such devices, does not pose unacceptable risks, we will further update the Covered List and
release a subsequent Public Notice.
PSHSB takes this action under its authority and obligation to publish and maintain the Covered
List. Sections 1.50002(a) and 1.50003 of the Commission’s rules require PSHSB to publish the Covered
List on the Commission's website, to maintain and update the Covered List, and to monitor the status of
28 Second Power Inverter National Security Determination at 4.

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determinations.29
Equipment Authorization Impacts of the Covered List. Under the Commission’s existing rules in
section 2.903(a), once added to the Covered List, “covered” equipment is prohibited from receiving
equipment authorizations.30 Moreover, pursuant to section 2.911 of the Commission’s rules, all
applications seeking equipment authorization from the Commission must certify that the equipment is not
prohibited from receiving an equipment authorization by virtue of being “covered equipment.”31 By so
certifying, the applicant would be certifying that the equipment does not qualify as equipment listed in
this Public Notice as “covered.” We clarify that these updates will not implicate various rules and
programs applicable to entities “identified” on the Covered List, because this newly-covered equipment is
identified by place of production, not by entity.32
On July 28, 2026, the Office of Engineering and Technology issued a Public Notice waiving the
applicability of the prohibitions against Class I and Class II permissive changes under 47 CFR §§
2.932(b) and 2.1043(b) to software and firmware updates that mitigate harm to U.S. consumers for
“covered” power inverters and advanced robotic devices that received FCC authorization prior to the
addition of those devices to the Covered List.33 We clarify that July 28 waiver of the FCC’s permissive
changes rules apply to “power inverters” and “foreign-produced power inverters” under the revised
definitions in the Second Power Inverter National Security Determination.
The updated Covered List is attached as Appendix A to this Public Notice and is published on the
Bureau’s website at https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist.34 The Second Power Inverters National
Security Determination is attached as Appendix B.
We note the continued availability of FCC staff guidance pursuant to sections 0.191 and 0.31(i)
of the Commission’s rules. Commission staff will provide guidance to TCBs, test labs, and equipment
authorization applicants on the impact of these updates.
For further information, please contact Matthew Chai, Attorney Advisor, Operations and
Emergency Management Division, Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau at 202-418-1112 or
Matthew.Chai@fcc.gov.
29 47 CFR §§ 1.50002(a), 1.50003. See Supply Chain Second Report and Order, 35 FCC Rcd at 14317, 14319,
14325, paras. 72, 77, 92.
30 47 CFR § 2.903(a).
31 47 CFR § 2.911(d)(5)(i).
32 See 47 CFR §§ 2.903, 2.906, 2.907, 2.911, 2.929, 2.932, 2.938, 2.1033, 2.1043.
33 See FCC, Office of Engineering and Technology Announces Waiver of Prohibitions on Certain Class I and Class
II Permissive Changes to Covered Foreign-Produced Advance Robotic Devises and Covered Foreign-Produced
Power Inverters, ET Docket No. 21-232, Public Notice, DA 26-789 (OET July 28, 2026).
34 The FCC website also contains a list of certain affiliates and subsidiaries of entities identified on the Covered List.
The list of affiliates and subsidiaries does not constitute a comprehensive list of all entities that the Commission may
find, upon further examination, to qualify as relevant subsidiaries or affiliates of entities on the Covered List. Those
entities, whether or not they currently provide covered communications equipment or services, are subject to the
Commission’s prohibitions, such as the prohibition against obtaining authorizations for covered equipment. See
Reminder: Communications Equipment And Services On The Covered List Pose An Unacceptable Risk To National
Security, National Security Advisory No. 2025-01, DA 25-927, note 3 (PSHSB Oct. 14, 2025).

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APPENDIX A
COVERED LIST (Updated August 20, 2026)*†±
Covered Equipment or Services*
Date of Inclusion on
Covered List
Telecommunications equipment produced or provided by Huawei Technologies
Company, including telecommunications or video surveillance services produced
or provided by such entity or using such equipment.
March 12, 2021
Telecommunications equipment produced or provided by ZTE Corporation,
including telecommunications or video surveillance services provided or provided
by such entity or using such equipment.
March 12, 2021
Video surveillance and telecommunications equipment produced or provided by
Hytera Communications Corporation, to the extent it is used for the purpose of
public safety, security of government facilities, physical security surveillance of
critical infrastructure, and other national security purposes, including
telecommunications or video surveillance services produced or provided by such
entity or using such equipment.
March 12, 2021
Video surveillance and telecommunications equipment produced or provided by
Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology Company, to the extent it is used for
the purpose of public safety, security of government facilities, physical security
surveillance of critical infrastructure, and other national security purposes,
including telecommunications or video surveillance services produced or provided
by such entity or using such equipment.
March 12, 2021
Video surveillance and telecommunications equipment produced or provided by
Dahua Technology Company, to the extent it is used for the purpose of public
safety, security of government facilities, physical security surveillance of critical
infrastructure, and other national security purposes, including telecommunications
or video surveillance services produced or provided by such entity or using such
equipment.
March 12, 2021
Information security products, solutions, and services supplied, directly or
indirectly, by AO Kaspersky Lab or any of its predecessors, successors, parents,
subsidiaries, or affiliates.
March 25, 2022
International telecommunications services provided by China Mobile
International USA Inc. subject to section 214 of the Communications Act of
1934.
March 25, 2022
Telecommunications services provided by China Telecom (Americas) Corp.
subject to section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934.
March 25, 2022
International telecommunications services provided by Pacific Networks Corp.
and its wholly-owned subsidiary ComNet (USA) LLC subject to section 214 of the
Communications Act of 1934.
September 20, 2022
International telecommunications services provided by China Unicom (Americas)
Operations Limited subject to section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934.
September 20, 2022
Cybersecurity and anti-virus software produced or provided by Kaspersky Lab,
Inc. or any of its successors and assignees.
July 23, 2024
Uncrewed aircraft systems (UAS) and UAS critical components produced in a
foreign country††—except:
(a) UAS and UAS critical components included on the Defense Contract
Management Agency’s (DCMA’s) Blue UAS Cleared List, until January 1, 2028,#
(b) UAS and UAS critical components that qualify as “domestic end products”
under the Buy American Standard, 48 CFR 25.101(a), until January 1, 2028;
(c) devices which have been granted a Conditional Approval by DoW or DHS; and
December 22, 2025
Updated: January 7, 2026
Updated: March 18, 2026

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(d) foreign-produced “Toy Drones,” as defined in the National Security
Determination, and “Toy Drones that contain foreign-produced components.”
All communications and video surveillance equipment and services listed in
Section 1709(a)(1) of the FY25 National Defense Authorization Act (Pub. L. 118-
159).
Updated: June 15, 2026
Updated: July 21, 2026
Routers^ produced in a foreign country, except routers which have been granted a
Conditional Approval by DoW or DHS.
March 23, 2026
International telecommunications services provided by Digitalsystem Technology
Inc., subject to section 214 of the Communications Act of 1934.
July 7, 2026
Foreign-produced power inverters,£ except power inverters which have been
granted a Conditional Approval by DoW or DHS.

July 28, 2026
Updated: August 20, 2026
Foreign-produced advanced robotic devices,³ except advanced robotic devices
which have been granted a Conditional Approval by DoW.
July 28, 2026
*The inclusion of producers or providers of equipment or services named on this list should be read to
include the subsidiaries and affiliates of such entities.

†Where equipment or services on the list are identified by category, such category should be construed to
include only equipment or services capable of the functions outlined in sections 2(b)(2)(A), (B), or (C) of
the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, 47 U.S.C. § 1601(b)(2)(A)-(C).
±The scope of the Covered List is affected by the Conditional Approvals that we have received.
††For purposes of inclusion of UAS and UAS critical components, we incorporate the definitions included
in the associated National Security Determination.
#The “Blue UAS list” referred to in the National Security Determination is the combination of the “Blue
UAS Cleared List” at https://bluelist.appsplatformportals.us/Cleared-List/ and the list of compliant UAS
components and software at https://bluelist.appsplatformportals.us/Framework/. We use the term “Blue
UAS Cleared List” to refer to both lists.
^For purposes of inclusion of routers, we incorporate the definitions included in the associated National
Security Determination.
³For purposes of inclusion of advanced robotic devices, we incorporate the definitions included in the
associated National Security Determination.
£For purposes of inclusion of power inverters, we incorporate the definitions included in the associated
National Security Determination.

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APPENDIX B


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