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Federal Register Public Inspection — Transportation (FAA, NHTSA, rail, pipeline, maritime)Doubao · 实盘不做把握 8/10不做原因:标的无直接敞口
北京时间·🕒 发布 20:45:00(美东 08:45)·⟳ 抓取 20:45:52·⚡ 决策 10-16 20:50:51 +4m59s·11.1 天前

FAA发布最终适航指令,修订空客A330-841/-941发动机引气系统高压阀门维修要求,对美国运营商成本极低且为既有规则的程序性更新

这是常规航空安全适航指令的程序性更新:源自EASA 2026年3月指令、6月已公示NPRM,无新增意外事实;美国仅22架飞机、总合规成本不足3万美元,无停飞或运营限制,对空客及任何运营商均不构成可交易的损益或供需冲击,也不存在受益的零部件供应商量级(HPV改进件为空客改装件,未点名任何上市供应商且无金额弹性)。

📄 原文Federal Register Public Inspection — Transportation (FAA, NHTSA, rail, pipeline, maritime)Federal Register Public Inspection — Transportation (FAA, NHTSA, rail, pipeline,↗ 原文
[Rule] Airworthiness Directives: Airbus SAS Airplanes
[4910-13-P] DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION Federal Aviation Administration 14 CFR Part 39 [Docket No. FAA-2026-4649; Proj…
不做 Airbus SE(AIR.FR)
程序性适航指令、无新增事实且不增加经济负担,对空客无损益或需求影响,不具备交易edge
不做 Delta Air Lines(DAL.US)
22架机队、单机成本数百至数万美元,materiality可忽略;评论获采纳的轻微正面不构成催化
展开详情(成交明细 / 研究档案 / 原文全文 / 决策记录链)

研究档案

结论摘要

FAA最终适航指令只是把EASA已发布7个月、6月已公示的A330neo引气阀门维修要求在美国落地,22架飞机、全美成本上限约2.9万美元,FAA明示不增加运营商负担;无停飞、无赔偿、无新增预期差,对空客和航司均无交易edge。

🔎 新鲜度:最早出现 2026-03-19 · 扩散 low · price-in 风险 high ↗

主要风险

  • 理论尾部风险:若后续全球机队出现HPV导致的实际空中事故,可能引发A330neo停飞级事件,但本指令文本无此信号,属于另起事件
  • 未逐一核验HPV零件号71070A030001的供应商;但FAA成本表显示可选改装单机零件费约9.7万美元、机队规模极小,不足以构成任何上市供应商的业绩弹性

反向证据

  • 做空前查反向 · 来源 filing · 日期 2026-10-16 · 影响 invalidates
    指令不含停飞或即时禁飞条款,合规期以生效日后维修窗口执行,且提供AMOC与既往维修credit,无做空催化
    检索:A330neo HPV bleed air valve grounding fleet shutdown AD 2026 原文 ↗
  • 做多前查反向 · 来源 filing · 日期 2026-10-16 · 影响 none
    改装通过空客服务通告A330-36-3057执行,FAA估算单机零件费约9.7万美元、仅22架美国注册机队,未点名独立上市供应商,收入弹性无法支撑做多
    检索:HPV part 71070A030001 supplier Airbus A330 modification 210503 beneficiary 原文 ↗

先例如何影响了这次决策

对本次决策的影响:先例证据不改变结论,故不调用event_study;此类FAA最终规则属例行行政事项

方向:未检索先例:常规、微量级、程序性适航指令历史上对飞机制造商和航司股价无可测影响,做事件研究不会改变NO_CAUSAL_EXPOSURE结论

涨幅量级:不适用:全美合规总成本上限约2.9万美元,量级低于任何可交易主体市值的百万分之一

形态:不适用

工具执行结果 · 成功 1 · 降级 0 · 失败 0 · 取消 0
  1. search_processed_events 成功 stock_tools HTTP · 9 ms
    {"result": "search_processed_events:agent query=`airbus a330 hpv clip final rule federal register 2026-21331 | faa airworthiness directive airbus a330-841 a330-941 ebas high pressure valve ad 2026-20-15 | faa-2026-4649 easa ad 20`;结构化索引覆盖完整 72 小时;旧记录兼容扫描近 0.0/72 小时、0 条本臂决策(完整),返回 0 条候选。未命中只表示这些 agen

原文全文

展开原文 · 26,699 字
[4910-13-P]
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Federal Aviation Administration
14 CFR Part 39
[Docket No. FAA-2026-4649; Project Identifier MCAI-2025-00835-T; Amendment
39-23488; AD 2026-20-15]
RIN 2120-AA64
Airworthiness Directives; Airbus SAS Airplanes
AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.
ACTION: Final rule.
SUMMARY: The FAA is superseding Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2025-04-05, which
applied to all Airbus SAS Model A330-841 and -941 airplanes. AD 2025-04-05 required
a revision of the existing airplane flight manual (AFM) and removal of the previously
required limitations; a revision of the existing minimum equipment list (MEL); one-time
or repetitive seal integrity tests of each engine bleed air system (EBAS) high pressure
valve (HPV); additional maintenance instructions and corrective actions; and repetitive
replacement of affected HPV clips; as applicable. AD 2025-04-05 also limited the
installation of affected HPV clips. Since the FAA issued AD 2025-04-05, an improved
EBAS HPV with unaffected HPV clips was certified, and it was determined that the
bleed monitoring computer (BMC) software (SW) must be updated. This AD continues
to require the actions in AD 2025-04-05, except for repetitive replacement of affected
HPV clips. This AD also requires updating the BMC SW, additional work, and an
additional revision of the existing MEL for the engine bleed overpressure valve; as
applicable. This AD also prohibits the installation of certain BMC software. The FAA is
issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition on these products.

DATES: This AD is effective [INSERT DATE 35 DAYS AFTER DATE OF
PUBLICATION IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER].
The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference of a
certain publication listed in this AD as of [INSERT DATE 35 DAYS AFTER DATE OF
PUBLICATION IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER].
ADDRESSES:
AD Docket: You may examine the AD docket at regulations.gov under Docket No. FAA2026-4649; or in person at Docket Operations between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday
through Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD docket contains this final rule, the
mandatory continuing airworthiness information (MCAI), any comments received, and
other information. The address for Docket Operations is U.S. Department of
Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140,
1200 New Jersey Avenue SE, Washington, DC 20590.
Material Incorporated by Reference:
• For European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) material identified in this
AD, contact EASA, Konrad-Adenauer-Ufer 3, 50668 Cologne, Germany; telephone +49
221 8999 000; email ADs@easa.europa.eu. You may find this material on the EASA
website at ad.easa.europa.eu.
• You may view this material at the FAA, Airworthiness Products Section,
Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA. For information on
the availability of this material at the FAA, call 206-231-3195. It is also available at
regulations.gov under Docket No. FAA-2026-4649.
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Rochelle Montgomery, Aviation
Safety Engineer, FAA, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198; phone: 405-5510414; email: Rochelle.Montgomery@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:
Background
The FAA issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR
part 39 to supersede AD 2025-04-05, Amendment 39-22963 (90 FR 10853, February 28,
2025) (AD 2025-04-05). AD 2025-04-05 applied to all Airbus SAS Model A330-841 and
-941 airplanes. AD 2025-04-05 required a revision of the existing AFM and removal of
the previously required limitations; a revision of the existing MEL; one-time or repetitive
seal integrity tests of each EBAS HPV; additional maintenance instructions and
corrective actions; and repetitive replacement of affected HPV clips; as applicable.
AD 2025-04-05 also limited the installation of affected HPV clips. The FAA issued
AD 2025-04-05 to address a leaking HPV that may expose the pressure regulating valve
(PRV), which is installed downstream from the HPV to high pressure, possibly damaging
the PRV itself and preventing its closure. The unsafe condition, if not addressed, could
result in high pressure and temperatures in the duct downstream from the PRV, with
possible duct burst, damage to several systems, and consequent loss of control of the
airplane.
The NPRM was published in the Federal Register on June 4, 2026 (91 FR
33674). The NPRM was prompted by EASA AD 2025-0104R1, dated March 19, 2026
(EASA AD 2025-0104R1) (also referred to as the MCAI), issued by EASA, which is the
Technical Agent for the Member States of the European Union. The MCAI states an
improved HPV has been certified (Airbus Modification 210503), which introduces
several design improvements and is equipped with HPV clips that do not have to be
replaced at predefined intervals. The MCAI also states that it has been determined that
the optional modification to install BMC SW 5.0 must be mandated on airplanes on
which BMC SW 4.0 or 4.1 is installed, additional work defined in a later revision of the
other service information must be accomplished, and new master minimum equipment

list (MMEL) content must be implemented for airplanes on which BMC SW 4.0 or 4.1 is
installed. The MCAI further specifies that modification of both affected HPVs terminates
the HPV clip replacement for the airplane, provided no affected HPV is re-installed on
that airplane.
In the NPRM, the FAA proposed to continue to require the actions in AD 202504-05 except for repetitive replacement of affected HPV clips, as specified in EASA AD
2025-0104R1. The NPRM also proposed to require updating the BMC SW, additional
work, and an additional revision of the existing MEL for the engine bleed overpressure
valve, as applicable; and to prohibit the installation of certain BMC software; as specified
in EASA AD 2025-0104R1. The FAA is issuing this AD to address the unsafe condition
on these products.
You may examine the MCAI in the AD docket at regulations.gov under Docket
No. FAA-2026-4649.
Discussion of Final Airworthiness Directive
Comments
The FAA received a comment from the Air Line Pilots Association, International
(ALPA) who supported the NPRM without change.
The FAA received an additional comment from Delta Air Lines (Delta). The
following presents the comments received on the NPRM and the FAA’s response.
Request to Provide Credit for Replacement of Affected HPVs
Delta requested that the FAA revise the proposed AD to provide credit for
replacement of affected EBAS HPVs (part number (P/N) 71070A010001 or
P/N 71070A020001) with non-affected EBAS HPVs (P/N 71070A030001), using
FAA-approved maintenance data, including the Airbus aircraft maintenance manual
(AMM). Delta noted Option 2 of Airbus Service Bulletin A330-36-3057, dated
October 28, 2024 (Airbus Service Bulletin A330-36-3057), provides procedures for

replacing affected HPVs with non-affected HPVs using Airbus AMM Tasks 36-11-51000-806 and 36-11-51-400-806, in lieu of modification of the HPVs in Option 1 of that
service bulletin as referenced in paragraph (30) of EASA AD 2025-0104R1. Delta stated
operators are already conducting unscheduled removal and replacement of HPVs during
normal operations, and that allowing credit for replacement of affected HPVs with
non-affected HPVs using approved AMM procedures would provide operational
flexibility during unscheduled maintenance while achieving the same configuration and
maintaining an acceptable level of safety.
The FAA agrees it acceptable to replace the affected HPVs with non-affected
HPVs using Option 2 of Airbus Service Bulletin A330-36-3057 in lieu of modifying the
affected HPVs using Option 1 of that service bulletin. Accordingly, the FAA has revised
the exception in paragraph (h)(10) to specify that the modification or replacement of both
affected HPVs in accordance with Airbus Service Bulletin A330-36-3057 constitutes
terminating action for the HPV clip replacement. In addition, the FAA has added new
paragraph (i) to this AD to provide credit for accomplishing the replacement using AMM
Tasks 36-11-51-000-806 and 36-11-51-400-806 before the effective date of this AD.
Under the provisions of paragraph (k)(1) of this AD, the FAA will consider requests for
alternative methods of compliance, should operators wish to use other maintenance data
or the applicable AMM tasks after the effective date of this AD.
Conclusion
These products have been approved by the civil aviation authority of another
country and are approved for operation in the United States. Pursuant to the FAA’s
bilateral agreement with this State of Design Authority, that authority has notified the
FAA of the unsafe condition described in the MCAI referenced above. The FAA
reviewed the relevant data, considered any comments received, and determined that air
safety requires adopting this AD as proposed. Accordingly, the FAA is issuing this AD to

address the unsafe condition on these products. Except for minor editorial changes, and
any other changes described previously, this AD is adopted as proposed in the NPRM.
None of the changes will increase the economic burden on any operator.
Material Incorporated by Reference Under 1 CFR Part 51
EASA AD 2025-0104R1 specifies procedures for the following retained actions:
• For Group 1 airplanes (equipped with BMC SW 4.0) and Group 2 airplanes
(equipped with BMC SW 4.1 standard), a revision of the Limitations section of the
existing AFM; and for Groups 1 and 2 and Group 3 (equipped with BMC SW 5.0 or later
approved SW standard and an affected HPV) airplanes, removal of the previously
required limitations.
• For Groups 1 and 2 airplanes, implementation of the MMEL update that
includes new provisions and procedures for Air Conditioning Pack, Engine Bleed Air
Supply System, Engine Bleed IP (Intermediate Pressure) Check Valve, and Engine Bleed
HP (High Pressure) Valve; and cancellation of the dispatch restrictions.
• For Group 2 airplanes, a seal integrity test of each HPV; for Group 1 airplanes,
repetitive seal integrity tests of each HPV; and corrective actions, which include
replacement of the HPV, a detailed inspection of the wing bellow on engine 1(2), and
replacement of any damaged or deformed wing bellow.
EASA AD 2025-0104R1 describes the following retained maintenance
instructions, among other actions, to be accomplished following certain faults or failures,
on Groups 1 and 2 airplanes:
• HPV troubleshooting procedure and additional maintenance actions after any
Class 1 maintenance message associated with an HPV fault and corrective actions, which
includes replacement of the HPV or wing bellow.
• HPV seal integrity test and the additional maintenance actions after any Class 1
or Class 2 maintenance message associated with a PRV fault and corrective actions,

which includes replacement of the HPV and PRV, a detailed inspection of the wing
bellow on engine 1(2), and replacement of any damaged or deformed wing bellow.
• A visual (borescope) inspection of the EBAS to detect signs of foreign object
debris (FOD), including metallic debris in the butterfly valve and dents or damage of the
flaps of the intermediate pressure check valve (IPCV), and dents and missing segments in
the PRV, the header of the HP/IP duct, y-duct, and pylon ducts after any failure of an
HPV clip and/or any of the HPV butterfly sealing rings, and corrective actions, which
includes FOD removal and replacement of the IPCV or PRV.
• A seal integrity test of each HPV after any takeoff or go-around accomplished
with “packs OFF” or “APU bleed ON” or “engine bleed OFF” and corrective actions,
which include replacement of the HPV, a detailed inspection of the wing bellow on
engine 1(2), and replacement of any damaged or deformed wing bellow.
• Additional actions to be performed for any Class 1 maintenance message
associated with an HPV fault.
EASA AD 2025-0104R1 also specifies the following retained limitations for the
installation of affected parts:
• For Groups 1, 2, and 3 airplanes, installation of an affected HPV clip on an
affected HPV on an airplane, provided it is a new affected clip (i.e., not previously
installed on any HPV) and that following installation, it is replaced according to the
referenced service information.
• For Groups 1, 2, and 3 airplanes, installation of an affected HPV on an airplane,
provided it is a serviceable HPV and that following installation, the affected HPV clips of
that HPV are replaced with new clips according to the referenced service information.
EASA AD 2025-0104R1 also specifies that, for Group 1 airplanes, modification
(update to BMC SW 4.1) of the airplane terminates the repetitive seal integrity tests of
each HPV.

EASA AD 2025-0104R1 specifies the following new actions:
• For Groups 1 and 2 airplanes, modification (update to BMC SW 5.0) of the
airplane, which includes deletion of the operations engineering bulletin (OEB) reminder
data from the flight warning computer (FWC) database.
• For Group 3 airplanes, accomplishment of additional work (deletion of the OEB
reminder data from the FWC database).
• For Groups 1 and 2 airplanes, implementation of the MMEL update that
includes new provisions for Engine Bleed Overpressure Valve.
EASA AD 2025-0104R1 also prohibits the installation of the following affected
parts:
• BMC SW 4.0 or BMC SW 4.1 on any Group 3 or Group 4 (embodied with
Airbus modifications 210503 and 210504 in production) airplane, and on any Group 1 or
2 airplane after modification (update to BMC SW 5.0) of the airplane.
• An affected HPV on any Group 4 airplane.
EASA AD 2025-0104R1 also specifies that, for Groups 1, 2, and 3 airplanes,
modification of both affected HPVs terminates the HPV clip replacement for the airplane,
provided no affected HPV is re-installed on that airplane; and if modification of the two
affected HPVs are accomplished at different times, the HPV clip replacement is only
applicable to the affected HPV.
This material is reasonably available because the interested parties have access to
it through their normal course of business or by the means identified in the ADDRESSES
section.
Costs of Compliance
The FAA estimates that this AD would affect 22 airplanes of U.S. registry. The
FAA estimates the following costs to comply with this AD:

Estimated costs for required actions
Parts
cost

Cost per
product

Cost on U.S.
operators

Up to
$28

Up to
$1,303

Up to
$28,666

New actions for Groups 1 5 work-hours X $85 $524
and 2 airplanes (software per hour = $425
update, additional work,
and MEL revision)

$949

Up to
$20,878*

New actions for Group 3
airplanes (additional
work)

$170

Up to
$3,740*

Action

Labor cost

Retained actions from
AD 2025-04-05

Up to 15 workhours X $85 per
hour = $1,275

2 work-hours X $85 $0
per hour = $170

* The FAA has no definitive data to determine how many affected airplanes are in each
airplane group.
The FAA estimates the following costs to do any necessary on-condition actions
that would be required based on the results of any required actions. The FAA has no way
of determining the number of aircraft that might need these on-condition actions:
Estimated costs of on-condition actions
Labor cost

Parts cost

Cost per product

Up to 19 work-hours X $85 per hour = $1,615

Up to $114,742

Up to $116,357

The FAA has received no definitive data on which to base the cost estimates for
the maintenance actions specified in this AD.
Estimated costs for optional modification of both affected HPVs
Labor cost

Parts cost

Cost per product

11 work-hours X $85 per hour = $935

$96,885

$97,790

Authority for This Rulemaking
Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA’s authority to issue rules on
aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the authority of the FAA Administrator.
Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of the Agency’s
authority.

The FAA is issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in Subtitle VII,
Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: General requirements. Under that section, Congress
charges the FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by
prescribing regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator finds
necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within the scope of that authority
because it addresses an unsafe condition that is likely to exist or develop on products
identified in this rulemaking action.
Regulatory Findings
This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 13132. This
AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, on the relationship between the
national government and the States, or on the distribution of power and responsibilities
among the various levels of government.
For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
(1) Is not a “significant regulatory action” under Executive Order 12866,
(2) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
(3) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or negative, on a
substantial number of small entities under the criteria of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.
List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39
Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by reference, Safety.
The Amendment
Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the Administrator, the FAA
amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:
PART 39 - AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:
Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

§ 39.13 [Amended]
2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by:
a. Removing Airworthiness Directive (AD) 2025-04-05, Amendment 39-22963
(90 FR 10853, February 28, 2025); and
b. Adding the following new AD:
2026-20-15 Airbus SAS: Amendment 39-23488; Docket No. FAA-2026-4649; Project
Identifier MCAI-2025-00835-T.
(a) Effective Date
This airworthiness directive (AD) is effective [INSERT DATE 35 DAYS AFTER
DATE OF PUBLICATION IN THE FEDERAL REGISTER].
(b) Affected ADs
This AD replaces AD 2025-04-05, Amendment 39-22963 (90 FR 10853,
February 28, 2025) (AD 2025-04-05).
(c) Applicability
This AD applies to all Airbus SAS Model A330-841 and -941 airplanes,
certificated in any category.
(d) Subject
Air Transport Association (ATA) of America Code 36, Pneumatic.
(e) Unsafe Condition
This AD was prompted by reports of leaking bleed system high pressure valves
(HPV), likely due to HPV clip failure and sealing ring damage. This AD was also
prompted by certification of an improved HPV with unaffected HPV clips and the
determination that the bleed monitoring computer (BMC) software must be updated. The
FAA is issuing this AD to address a leaking HPV that may expose the pressure regulating
valve (PRV), which is installed downstream from the HPV to high pressure, possibly
damaging the PRV itself and preventing its closure. The unsafe condition, if not

addressed, could result in high pressure and temperatures in the duct downstream from
the PRV, with possible duct burst, damage to several systems, and consequent loss of
control of the airplane.
(f) Compliance
Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, unless already done.
(g) Requirements
Except as specified in paragraphs (h), (i), and (j) of this AD: Comply with all
required actions and compliance times specified in, and in accordance with, European
Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD 2025-0104R1, dated March 19, 2026 (EASA
AD 2025-0104R1).
(h) Exceptions to EASA AD 2025-0104R1
(1) Where EASA AD 2025-0104R1 refers to May 21, 2025 (the effective date of
the original issue of EASA AD 2025-0104, dated May 7, 2025), this AD requires using
the effective date of this AD.
(2) Where EASA AD 2025-0104R1 refers to May 28, 2024 (the effective date of
EASA AD 2023-0111R1, dated May 28, 2024), this AD requires using April 4, 2025 (the
effective date of AD 2025-04-05).
(3) Where EASA AD 2025-0104R1 refers to June 2, 2023 (the effective date of
the original issue of EASA AD 2023-0111, dated May 26, 2023), this AD requires using
April 4, 2025 (the effective date of AD 2025-04-05).
(4) Where paragraph (19) of EASA AD 2025-0104R1 refers to December 8, 2022
(the effective date of EASA AD 2022-0227, dated November 24, 2022), this AD requires
using April 4, 2025 (the effective date of AD 2025-04-05).
(5) Where paragraph (21) of EASA AD 2025-0104R1 refers to December 8, 2022
(the effective date of EASA AD 2022-0227, dated November 24, 2022), this AD requires

using July 18, 2023 (the effective date of AD 2023-11-08, Amendment 39-22454 (88 FR
38384, June 13, 2023)).
(6) Where EASA AD 2025-0104R1 refers to September 5, 2022 (the effective
date of EASA AD 2022-0181, dated August 29, 2022), this AD requires using September
15, 2022 (the effective date of AD 2022-19-05, Amendment 39-22174 (87 FR 54870,
September 8, 2022)).
(7) Where EASA AD 2025-0104R1 defines a Serviceable HPV, in part, as
“EBAS HPV, eligible for installation in accordance with Airbus instructions”, this AD
requires replacing that text with “EBAS HPV eligible for installation”.
(8) Where paragraphs (1), (2), (3), (7), and (29) of EASA AD 2025-0104R1
specify to inform all flightcrews of airplane flight manual (AFM) revisions and dispatch
limitations, and thereafter operate the airplane accordingly, this AD does not require
those actions, as those actions are already required by existing FAA operating regulations
(see 14 CFR 91.9, 91.505, and 121.137 for AFM requirements and 14 CFR 121.628(a)(2)
and (5) for minimum equipment list requirements).
(9) Where paragraph (20) of EASA AD 2025-0104R1 specifies “as required by
paragraph (17) of the original issue of this AD”, this AD requires replacing that text with
“as required by AD 2025-04-05 as specified in paragraph (17) of EASA AD 20230111R1”.
(10) Where paragraph (30) of EASA AD 2025-0104R1 specifies “Modification of
both EBAS HPV”, this AD requires replacing that text with “Modification or
replacement of both affected HPVs”.
(11) This AD does not adopt the “Remarks” section of EASA AD 2025-0104R1.
(i) Credit for Previous Actions
Replacing both affected HPVs with non-affected HPVs having part number
71070A030001 before the effective date of this AD using Airbus Aircraft Maintenance

Manual (AMM) Tasks 36-11-51-000-806 and 36-11-51-400-806 may be accomplished in
lieu of modifying both affected HPVs, as specified in paragraph (30) of EASA AD 20250104R1.
(j) No Reporting Requirement
Although the material referenced in EASA AD 2025-0104R1 specifies to submit
certain information to the manufacturer, this AD does not include that requirement.
(k) Additional AD Provisions
The following provisions also apply to this AD:
(1) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs): The Manager, AIR-520,
Continued Operational Safety Branch, FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this
AD, if requested using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with
14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or responsible Flight
Standards Office, as appropriate. If sending information directly to the manager of the
Continued Operational Safety Branch, send it to the attention of the person identified in
paragraph (l)(1) of this AD and email to: AMOC@faa.gov.
(i) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate principal inspector,
or lacking a principal inspector, the manager of the responsible Flight Standards Office.
(ii) AMOCs approved previously for AD 2025-04-05 are approved as AMOCs for
the corresponding provisions of EASA AD 2025-0104R1 that are required by paragraph
(g) of this AD.
(2) Contacting the Manufacturer: For any requirement in this AD to obtain
instructions from a manufacturer, the instructions must be accomplished using a method
approved by the Manager, AIR-520, Continued Operational Safety Branch, FAA; or
EASA; or Airbus SAS’s EASA Design Organization Approval (DOA). If approved by
the DOA, the approval must include the DOA-authorized signature.

(3) Required for Compliance (RC): Except as required by paragraphs (j) and
(k)(2) of this AD, if any material referenced in EASA AD 2025-0104R1 contains
paragraphs that are labeled as RC, the instructions in RC paragraphs, including
subparagraphs under an RC paragraph, must be done to comply with this AD; any
paragraphs, including subparagraphs under those paragraphs, that are not identified as RC
are recommended. The instructions in paragraphs, including subparagraphs under those
paragraphs, not identified as RC may be deviated from using accepted methods in
accordance with the operator’s maintenance or inspection program without obtaining
approval of an AMOC, provided the instructions identified as RC can be done and the
airplane can be put back in an airworthy condition. Any substitutions or changes to
instructions identified as RC require approval of an AMOC.
(l) Additional Information
(1) For more information about this AD, contact Rochelle Montgomery, Aviation
Safety Engineer, FAA, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA 98198; phone: 405-5510414; email: Rochelle.Montgomery@faa.gov.
(2) For Airbus SAS material identified in this AD that is not incorporated by
reference, contact Airbus SAS, Airworthiness Office - EAL, Rond-Point Emile
Dewoitine No: 2, 31700 Blagnac Cedex, France; telephone +33 5 61 93 36 96; fax +33 5
61 93 45 80; email continued-airworthiness.a350@airbus.com; website airbus.com.
(m) Material Incorporated by Reference
(1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by reference
of the material listed in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
(2) You must use this material as applicable to do the actions required by this AD,
unless this AD specifies otherwise.
(i) European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) AD 2025-0104R1, dated
March 19, 2026.

(ii) [Reserved]
(3) For EASA material identified in this AD, contact EASA, Konrad-AdenauerUfer 3, 50668 Cologne, Germany; telephone +49 221 8999 000; email
ADs@easa.europa.eu. You may find this material on the EASA website at
ad.easa.europa.eu.
(4) You may view this material at the FAA, Airworthiness Products Section,
Operational Safety Branch, 2200 South 216th St., Des Moines, WA. For information on
the availability of this material at the FAA, call 206-231-3195.
(5) You may view this material at the National Archives and Records
Administration (NARA). For information on the availability of this material at NARA,
visit www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ ibr-locations or email
fr.inspection@nara.gov.
Issued on October 9, 2026.

Brian Knaup,
Acting Deputy Director, Integrated Certificate Management Division,
Aircraft Certification Service.
[FR Doc. 2026-21331 Filed: 10/16/2026 8:45 am; Publication Date: 10/19/2026]

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