FCC就Disney/ABC广播牌照续期诉讼提交驳回动议，反对迪士尼初步禁令申请

Case 1:26-cv-02902-LLA Document 23 Filed 09/03/26 Page 1 of 56 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA AMERICAN BROADCASTING COMPANIES, INC. et al., Plaintiffs, v. Civil Action No. 26-2902 (LLA) FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, et al., Defendants. DEFENDANTS’ COMBINED MOTION TO DISMISS, OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY RELIEF, AND MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT THEREOF Case 1:26-cv-02902-LLA Document 23 Filed 09/03/26 Page 2 of 56 TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents ............................................................................................................................. i Table of Authorities ........................................................................................................................ ii Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1 Background ..................................................................................................................................... 4 I. Statutory and Regulatory Framework. .................................................................... 4 A. Broadcast Licensing. ................................................................................... 4 B. Investigatory Power. ................................................................................... 7 C. Judicial Review of FCC Orders. ................................................................. 7 II. The Disney Antidiscrimination Investigation. ........................................................ 8 III. The License Renewal Proceeding. ........................................................................ 10 Legal Standards ............................................................................................................................. 12 I. Preliminary Injunctions under Winter. .................................................................. 12 II. Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1). ............................................................................. 13 Argument ...................................................................................................................................... 13 I. Plaintiffs Are Unlikely to Succeed on the Merits. ................................................ 14 A. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction Because Congress Has Channeled Judicial Review of Commission Orders to the Courts of Appeals. ........................ 14 B. Plaintiffs’ First Amendment Retaliation Claim Fails on the Merits. ........ 22 II. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Establish Irreparable Harm. .......................................... 36 III. The Balance of Equities and Public Interest Favor Denying Injunctive Relief. ... 44 IV. The Court Should Require Plaintiffs to Post Security. ......................................... 45 Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 46 - i - Case 1:26-cv-02902-LLA Document 23 Filed 09/03/26 Page 3 of 56 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) Cases AFL-CIO v. Sonderling, Civ. A. No. 26-2061 (JEB), 2026 WL 1906727 (D.D.C. July 2, 2026) ....................... 41, 42, 43 Air Trans. Ass’n of Am. v. Export-Import Bank of the U.S., 840 F. Supp. 2d 327 (D.D.C. 2012) .......................................................................................... 42 Alpine Secs. Corp. v. Fin. Indus. Reg. Auth., 121 F.4th 1314 (D.C. Cir. 2024) ............................................................................................... 41 Alter v. FCC, Civ. A. No. 24-0745 (AHA), 2025 WL 1454377 (D.D.C. May 21, 2025) ............................... 15 Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ................................................................................................ 13 Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006) .................................................................................................................. 13 Aref v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 242 (D.C. Cir. 2016) ............................................................................................ 22, 23 AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 220 F.3d 607 (D.C. Cir. 2000) .................................................................................................. 15 Axon Enter., Inc. v. FTC, 598 U.S. 175 (2023) ........................................................................................................... passim Barnes v. E-Sys., Inc. Grp. Hosp. Med. & Surgical Ins. Plan, 501 U.S. 1301 (1991) ................................................................................................................ 44 Beaumont Branch of the NAACP v. FCC, 854 F.2d 501 (D.C. Cir. 1988) .............................................................................................. 5, 24 Bilingual Bicultural Coal. on Mass Media, Inc. v. FCC, 595 F.2d 621 (D.C. Cir. 1978) .................................................................................................... 5 Biovail Corp. v. FDA, 448 F. Supp. 2d 154 (D.D.C. 2006) .......................................................................................... 44 Bland v. Blanche, Civ. A. No. 25-3499 (APM), 2026 WL 1998552 (D.D.C. July 10, 2026) ............................... 17 - ii - Case 1:26-cv-02902-LLA Document 23 Filed 09/03/26 Page 4 of 56 Bold Alliance v. FERC, Civ. A. No. 17-1822 (RJL), 2018 WL 4681004 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2018) ................................ 17 Chao v. Day, 436 F.3d 234 (D.C. Cir. 2006) .................................................................................................. 14 Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454 F.3d 290 (D.C. Cir. 2006) ............................................................................................ 36, 37 Clevinger v. Advoc. Holdings, Inc., 134 F.4th 1230 (D.C. Cir. 2025) ......................................................................................... 37, 41 ConverDyn v. Moniz, 68 F. Supp. 3d 34 (D.D.C. 2014) .............................................................................................. 42 Cruz v. DHS, Civ. A. No. 19-2727 (DLF), 2019 WL 8139805 (D.D.C. Nov. 21, 2019) ............................... 44 Damus v. Nielsen, 313 F. Supp. 3d 317 (D.D.C. 2018) .......................................................................................... 12 Davis v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ................................................................................................ 12 Doe v. DEA, 484 F.3d 561 (D.C. Cir. 2007) .................................................................................................. 16 DSE, Inc. v. United States, 169 F.3d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1999) .................................................................................................... 45 Elgin v. Dep't of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1 (2012) ...................................................................................................................... 18 Endocrine Soc’y v. FTC, 832 F. Supp. 3d 1 (D.D.C. 2026) ............................................................................ 21, 23, 24, 26 FCC v. ITT World Commc’ns, Inc., 466 U.S. 463 (1984) .................................................................................................................. 15 Feinerman v. Bernardi, 558 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2008) ............................................................................................ 42 Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905 (D.C. Cir. 2015) ............................................................................................ 12, 22 - iii - Case 1:26-cv-02902-LLA Document 23 Filed 09/03/26 Page 5 of 56 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010) ............................................................................................................ 18, 19 FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232 (1980) ............................................................................................................ 15, 20 Fund for Animals v. Frizzell, 530 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1975) .................................................................................................. 43 Gordon v. Holder, 632 F.3d 722 (D.C. Cir. 2011) .................................................................................................. 44 Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 2001) .............................................................................................. 13 Hanson v. Dist. of Columbia, 120 F.4th 223 (D.C. Cir. 2024) ........................................................................................... 37, 45 Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250 (2006) .................................................................................................................. 24 Houston Cmty. Coll. Sys. v. Wilson, 595 U.S. 468 (2022) .................................................................................................................. 23 Huang v. Wheeler, 215 F. Supp. 3d 100 (D.D.C. 2016) .......................................................................................... 13 In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176 (D.C. Cir. 1979) .................................................................................................. 17 Jenner & Block LLP v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 784 F. Supp. 3d 76 (D.D.C. 2025) ...................................................................................... 42, 43 Kareem v. Haspel, 986 F.3d 859 (D.C. Cir. 2021) .................................................................................................. 13 Khalil v. President, United States, 164 F.4th 259 (3d Cir. 2026) .............................................................................................. 21, 45 La Voz Radio de la Communidad v. FCC, 223 F.3d 313 (6th Cir. 2000) .................................................................................................... 15 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) .................................................................................................................. 13 - iv - Case 1:26-cv-02902-LLA Document 23 Filed 09/03/26 Page 6 of 56 Make the Road N.Y. v. Mullin, 179 F.4th 16 (D.C. Cir. 2026) ................................................................................................... 12 McLaughlin Chiropractic Assocs. v. McKesson Corp., 606 U.S. 146 (2025) ............................................................................................................ 15, 16 Media Matters for Am. v. FTC, No. 25-5302, 2025 WL 2988966 (D.C. Cir. 2026) ....................................................... 21, 23, 25 Media Matters for Am. v. Paxton, 138 F.4th 563 (D.C. Cir. 2025) ..................................................................................... 37, 38, 39 Media Matters for Am. v. FTC, 805 F. Supp. 3d 105 (D.D.C. 2025) .......................................................................................... 31 Mullin v. Doe, 146 S. Ct. 2121 (Jun. 26, 2026) .................................................................................... 13, 16, 36 Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Shalala, 81 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2000) .............................................................................................. 43 Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. NRC, 680 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1982) .................................................................................................. 20 Nat’l Ass’n of Broad. v. FCC, 147 F.4th 978 (D.C. Cir. 2025) ........................................................................................... 16, 22 Nat’l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943) .................................................................................................................. 23 Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. Jackson, 768 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 2011) ...................................................................................... 42, 43 Nieves v. Bartlett, 587 U.S. 391 (2019) .................................................................................................................. 22 Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009) ............................................................................................................ 12, 44 Nuclear Info. & Res. Serv. v. NRC, 509 F.3d 562 (D.C. Cir. 2007) .................................................................................................. 36 Off. of Commc’n of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413 (D.C. Cir. 1983) .................................................................................................. 4 - v - Case 1:26-cv-02902-LLA Document 23 Filed 09/03/26 Page 7 of 56 Petroleum Expl., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 304 U.S. 209 (1938) .................................................................................................................. 20 Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) .................................................................................................................. 23 Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1 (1974) ...................................................................................................................... 41 Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) .................................................................................................................... 17 Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388 (D.C. Cir. 2011) .................................................................................................. 12 Singh v. Carter, 185 F. Supp. 3d 11 (D.D.C. 2016) ............................................................................................ 12 Stahlman v. FCC, 126 F.2d 124 (D.C. Cir. 1942) .................................................................................................... 7 Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 602 U.S. 339 (2024) .................................................................................................................. 12 Susman Godfrey LLP v. Exec. Off. of Pres., 789 F. Supp. 3d 15 (D.D.C. 2025) ............................................................................................ 43 Telecomms. Rsch. and Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ............................................................................................. passim Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d 970 (D.C. Cir. 2005) .................................................................................................. 13 Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994) ............................................................................................................ 18, 19 Time Warner Ent. Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957 (D.C. Cir. 1996) .................................................................................................... 17 Trump v. United States, 603 U.S. 593 (2024) .................................................................................................................. 36 United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001) .................................................................................................................. 45 - vi - Case 1:26-cv-02902-LLA Document 23 Filed 09/03/26 Page 8 of 56 Va. Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 259 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir. 1958) .................................................................................................. 39 Virginian R. Co. v. Ry. Emps., 300 U.S. 515 (1937) .................................................................................................................. 45 Wagner v. FEC, 717 F.3d 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ................................................................................................ 15 Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305 (1982) .................................................................................................................. 44 Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7 (2008) .................................................................................................................. 3, 12 Wisc. Gas Co. v. FERC, 758 F.2d 669 (D.C. Cir. 1985) ............................................................................................ 36, 41 Xiaomi Corp. v. Dep’t of Def., Civ. A. No. 21-0280 (RC), 2021 WL 950144 (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2021) .................................... 42 Statutes 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq..................................................................................................................... 21 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ........................................................................................................................... 15 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) ...................................................................................................................... 17 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1) ............................................................................................................... passim 47 U.S.C. § 151 ......................................................................................................................... 4, 24 47 U.S.C. § 307(a) ...................................................................................................................... 5, 6 47 U.S.C. § 307(c)(1) .............................................................................................................. 2, 5, 7 47 U.S.C. § 307(c)(3) .......................................................................................................... 2, 40, 45 47 U.S.C. § 309 ............................................................................................................................. 26 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) ...................................................................................................................... 1, 5 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(1) ..................................................................................................................... 6 47 U.S.C. § 309(e) .............................................................................................................. 6, 43, 45 - vii - Case 1:26-cv-02902-LLA Document 23 Filed 09/03/26 Page 9 of 56 47 U.S.C. § 309(k)(1) ..................................................................................................................... 6 47 U.S.C. § 309(k)(3) ............................................................................................................... 6, 34 47 U.S.C. § 402 ........................................................................................................................... 6, 7 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) .......................................................................................................... 3, 8, 14, 39 47 U.S.C. § 402(b) ................................................................................................................. passim 47 U.S.C. § 403 ............................................................................................................................... 7 Rules Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)....................................................................................................... 1, 13, 22 Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(c) ..................................................................................................................... 45 Regulations 47 C.F.R. § 0.459 ............................................................................................................................ 9 47 C.F.R. § 1.62 .............................................................................................................................. 2 47 C.F.R. § 73.1020(a).................................................................................................................... 7 47 C.F.R. § 73.2080(a).................................................................................................................... 4 47 C.F.R. § 73.3539(c).................................................................................................... 1, 7, 26, 30 47 C.F.R. § 73.3584 ........................................................................................................................ 6 47 C.F.R. § 73.3584(b) ................................................................................................................... 6 47 C.F.R. § 73.3587 ........................................................................................................................ 6 Other Authorities Exec. Order No. 14151, Ending Radical and Wasteful Government DEI Programs and Preferencing, 90 Fed. Reg. 8339 (Jan. 20, 2025) ............................................................................................ 24 Reregulation of Radio and TV Broadcasting, 72 F.C.C.2d 534 (1979) ............................................................................................................ 30 Review of the Commission’s Broadcast and Cable Equal Employment Opportunity Rules and Policies, 17 FCC Rcd 24018 (2002) ........................................................................................... 5 - viii - Case 1:26-cv-02902-LLA Document 23 Filed 09/03/26 Page 10 of 56 The Federal Communication Commission and the remaining Defendants hereby oppose Plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motion (“PI Mot.,” Dkt. 2) and respectfully move this Court to dismiss the Complaint (Dkt. 1) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). INTRODUCTION This case arises from an investigation of the FCC’s Enforcement Bureau into allegations of unlawful discrimination by The Walt Disney Company (“Disney”), including by means of company-wide policies and practices governing its subsidiaries American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (“ABC”) and eight ABC owned and operated broadcast television stations (“Disney ABC stations” or “stations”). A year into that investigation, Disney’s responses to Commission information requests were deficient and nonresponsive. So, on April 28, 2026, the Commission’s Media Bureau issued an order directing the stations to apply for renewal of their licenses early, as is allowed in service of investigations under a longstanding Commission rule. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3539(c). The license renewal proceeding has generated a voluminous record, which consists of public comments both for and against renewal, including submissions relevant to the FCC’s discrimination investigation. The Commission is now analyzing that record, as well as Disney’s responses to the Enforcement Bureau’s inquiries. If, on review of those materials, the Commission determines that the license renewal criteria are satisfied, it will grant the stations’ applications. If instead the record raises “substantial and material questions of fact” as to whether renewal would serve “the public interest, convenience, and necessity,” or if the Commission is otherwise unable to make a public interest finding (for example, because of serious or repeated violations of the communications laws), the statute would require additional process—namely, a hearing on the applications. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a), (d), (e), (k). Case 1:26-cv-02902-LLA Document 23 Filed 09/03/26 Page 11 of 56 The Commission’s Chairman has repeatedly emphasized that, although the allegations against Disney are serious, he and the agency remain “open-minded,” have “not made a decision,” and are “going to follow the facts and the law wherever they [lead].” Ex. 1, David Shepardson, FCC Chair Says All Options Remain on Table in ABC License Review, Reuters, at 3 (June 25, 2026) (attached). And the renewal process in progress does not abridge or otherwise affect Plaintiffs’ rights. Licensees with pending renewal applications are entitled to continue operating without interruption during the license period for the duration of the renewal proceeding—even were it to result in a hearing. See 47 U.S.C. § 307(c)(1), (c)(3); 47 C.F.R. § 1.62. In fact, even if the Commission were to deny the stations’ applications, their licenses would remain in effect for however long they might wish to seek judicial review. 47 U.S.C. § 307(c)(3). Plaintiffs are not content to let the Commission’s ordinary investigative processes (and, if needed, ordinary processes of judicial review) run their course. They instead ask this Court to halt the license renewal proceeding in its tracks by issuing a preliminary injunction preventing the Commission from designating the matter for hearing—regardless what the evidence may show and before anyone would have seen the basis for such action. PI Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 51.1 Granting Plaintiffs’ request would mean taking administrative processes off the table before the Commission has seen and analyzed the voluminous evidence. This would only hobble the Commission’s efforts to investigate and resolve serious allegations that Disney has engaged in unlawful discrimination, and from otherwise ensuring that Disney’s stations are serving the public interest. Plaintiffs, in return, would only free themselves from the burdens of proving their case in administrative proceedings. 1 All pin cites are to the ECF-generated page numbers, appearing in blue color at the top, right corner of each page. - 2 - Case 1:26-cv-02902-LLA Document 23 Filed 09/03/26 Page 12 of 56 Plaintiffs have not justified such “extraordinary” relief. Winter v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). They are unlikely to prevail on the merits because this Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case. Congress has limited judicial review of Commission orders to the federal courts of appeals, see 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1); 47 U.S.C. § 402(a), and for many categories of licensing orders, to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 47 U.S.C. § 402(b). Under a well-established line of decisions beginning with Telecomms. Rsch. and Action Ctr. v. FCC (TRAC), 750 F.2d 70, 75-79 (D.C. Cir. 1984), these statutory claims-channeling provisions deprive district courts of federal-question jurisdiction in FCC cases—even where, as here, the agency has not yet issued any final, reviewable order. Plaintiffs cannot bypass these jurisdictional limits by framing their claim as one for “retaliation” in response to speech protected by the First Amendment. That theory requires them to show that “but for” animus toward Plaintiffs’ speech, the Commission would not have initiated the early renewal proceeding. Abundant evidence belies that conclusion; it was Disney’s lack of cooperation with the antidiscrimination inquiry that triggered the need for that additional investigatory step. Nor have Plaintiffs satisfied the other requirements for an injunction. Their claim of irreparable harm from retaliation fails for the same reasons they are unlikely to prevail on the merits of that claim. In addition, they have shown (at most) minimal and self-inflicted effects on speech, and no harms that could justify a preliminary injunction. The balance of equities and the public interest just as clearly weigh against enjoining the Commission’s investigation. Broadcasters are highly regulated parties subject to the Commission’s comprehensive oversight. Licenses grant them exclusive access—awarded for free—to highly valuable portions of the electromagnetic spectrum, an important and finite public resource. In return for that public benefit, Congress has required broadcasters to operate in the - 3 - Case 1:26-cv-02902-LLA Document 23 Filed 09/03/26 Page 13 of 56 public interest. To foreclose the Commission from using all the tools at its disposal to investigate whether Plaintiffs are meeting their statutory and regulatory duties would seriously harm both the government and the public. Those harms outweigh the comparatively minor injuries Plaintiffs attempt to show, particularly because the Communications Act ensures they may continue operating as usual while the Commission’s investigation unfolds. BACKGROUND I. Statutory and Regulatory Framework. A. Broadcast Licensing. Congress established the Commission “to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States,” communications over “wire and radio”—“without discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex.” 47 U.S.C. § 151. To that end, because broadcast television and radio transmissions require access to “radio” spectrum, awarding broadcast licenses is among the Commission’s core functions. See id. §§ 303, 307, 309. Spectrum is a valuable, finite public resource. And broadcast licenses confer exclusive access (for designated locations and frequency ranges) to that public resource for free. Courts accordingly recognize that “the award of a broadcast license should be a ‘public trust.’” Off. of Commc’n of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 707 F.2d 1413, 1427 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Consistent with that recognition, and with the Commission’s duty to guard against unlawful discrimination, 47 U.S.C. § 151, the agency’s rules set forth antidiscrimination obligations for broadcasters. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.2080(a). Broadcasters have additional public interest obligations as well, including requirements to maintain public inspection files; a duty to provide equal opportunity for airtime to political candidates; and responsibilities not to engage in news distortion, broadcast hoaxes, or indecent broadcasting. See, e.g., Ex. 2, FCC Reminds Broadcasters of Their - 4 - Case 1:26-cv-02902-LLA Document 23 Filed 09/03/26 Page 14 of 56 Public Interest Obligations, DA 26-530, at 5-6 (May 28, 2026) (“May 28 Public Notice,” attached, collecting these requirements). Under the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, the Commission “shall grant” radio licenses, including for broadcast television stations, only if doing so would serve the “public convenience, interest, or necessity.” 47 U.S.C. § 307(a). Likewise, broadcast licenses may be renewed only “if the Commission finds that [the] public interest, convenience, and necessity would be served thereby,” and other necessary requirements are satisfied. Id. § 307(c)(1); see also id. § 309(a), (k). It is well settled that “a license renewal will not be deemed to be in the public interest if a licensee has engaged in intentional employment discrimination” on the basis of race, sex, national origin, or religious affiliation. Beaumont Branch of the NAACP v. FCC, 854 F.2d 501, 506 (D.C. Cir. 1988); accord Bilingual Bicultural Coal. on Mass Media, Inc. v. FCC, 595 F.2d 621, 628 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (en banc); see also Review of the Commission’s Broadcast and Cable Equal Employment Opportunity Rules and Policies, 17 FCC Rcd 24018, 24036 ¶ 46 (2002) (“[a] documented pattern of intentional discrimination would put seriously into question a licensee’s character qualifications to remain a licensee” (alteration in original; quoting Bilingual Bicultural Coal., 595 F.2d at 629)). When “the licensee of a broadcast station submits an application to the Commission for renewal of such license, the Commission shall grant the application if it finds” that three conditions are satisfied: (A) the station has served the public interest, convenience, and necessity; (B) there have been no serious violations by the licensee of [the Communications Act] or the rules and regulations of the Commission; and (C) there have been no other violations by the licensee of [the Communications Act] or the rules and regulations of the Commission which, taken together, would constitute a pattern of abuse. - 5 - Case 1:26-cv-02902-LLA Document 23 Filed 09/03/26 Page 15 of 56 47 U.S.C. § 309(k)(1). “Any party in interest” with administrative standing may oppose a renewal application (and any license application) by “fil[ing] with the Commission a petition to deny.” Id. § 309(d)(1); see also 47 C.F.R. § 73.3584. The Commission’s rules allow for responses to such petitions, and also for replies. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3584(b). In addition, the Commission accepts informal comments that support or oppose broadcast license applications. Ex. 3, FCC, License Renewal Applications for Television Broadcast Stations (attached); see 47 C.F.R. § 73.3587 (informal objections). After a public notice period of at least thirty days (and, for license renewal applications, no fewer than thirty days before expiration of the current license term) the Commission “shall grant” applications where it has determined that doing so would serve the public interest. 47 U.S.C. § 307(a); see also id. §§ 307(d), 309(a), (b), (k). If the Commission is unable to reach that determination, however—including because “a substantial and material question of fact” is presented concerning whether the applicant has met the requirements for renewal—the agency must “formally designate the application for hearing.” Id. § 309(e); see also id. § 309(k)(3). If a hearing is designated, the “matters and things in issue” will be specified with “particularity,” and it will be a “full hearing” in which the applicant and all other parties in interest “shall be permitted to participate.” Id. § 309(e). While a renewal application is pending, the broadcast licensee’s existing license “continue[s] . . . in effect.” Id. § 307(c)(3). The period during which the existing license remains in effect includes the time needed for “any administrative or judicial hearing and final decision on” the renewal application, including “the disposition of any petition for rehearing pursuant to [47 U.S.C. §§ 402 and 405].” Id. If renewal proceedings do not prolong the existing license - 6 - Case 1:26-cv-02902-LLA Document 23 Filed 09/03/26 Page 16 of 56 period, broadcast licenses (other than initial licenses) ordinarily expire after a term of eight years. See id. § 307(c)(1); 47 C.F.R. § 73.1020(a). The default eight-year license term, however, is not unalterable. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 307(c)(1), 309(k)(2). In fact, the Communications Act bars the Commission from “adopt[ing] or follow[ing] any rule which would preclude it . . . from granting or renewing a license for a shorter period . . . if, in its judgment, the public interest, convenience or necessity would be served by” a shorter term. Id. Of particular relevance here, a longstanding FCC rule provides that licensees may be required to apply for renewal ahead of the default schedule “[w]henever the FCC regards [the] application . . . as essential to the proper conduct of a hearing or investigation.” 47 C.F.R. § 73.3539(c). B. Investigatory Power. The Communications Act grants the Commission full authority and power at any time to institute an inquiry, on its own motion, in any case and as to any matter or thing concerning which complaint is authorized to be made, to or before the Commission by any provision of [the Act], or concerning which any question may arise under any provisions of [the Act], or relating to the enforcement of any of the provisions [of the Act]. 47 U.S.C. § 403. This authority “embrace[s] an investigation aimed at the prevention or disclosure of practices contrary to the public interest.” Stahlman v. FCC, 126 F.2d 124, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1942); see also id. at 128 (“The Commission’s right to grant licenses or to revoke licenses in the public interest . . . implies the grant of all means necessary or appropriate to the discharge of the powers expressly granted.”). C. Judicial Review of FCC Orders. Under the Communications Act and the Administrative Orders Review Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2351—commonly known as the “Hobbs Act”— judicial review of FCC actions is limited to final orders of the Commission. See id. §§ 2342(1), 2344; 47 U.S.C. § 402. Review of most - 7 - Case 1:26-cv-02902-LLA Document 23 Filed 09/03/26 Page 17 of 56 Commission orders is governed by the Hobbs Act, which grants exclusive jurisdiction to any United States Court of Appeals other than the Federal Circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1); 47 U.S.C. § 402(a). For a narrower category of mostly licensing-related Commission orders, the Communications Act limits judicial review exclusively to the D.C. Circuit. 47 U.S.C. § 402(b). These claims-channeling provisions foreclose district court review of “any suit seeking relief that might affect the Circuit Court’s future jurisdiction.” TRAC, 750 F.2d at 78. That principle applies even before there is any final, reviewable agency order. See id. at 75-79. II. The Disney Antidiscrimination Investigation. In early 2025, following a series of public reports and allegations of racially or otherwise discriminatory practices at Disney, the FCC’s Chairman directed the Enforcement Bureau to open an investigation into whether Disney was complying with the Commission’s antidiscrimination requirements. See Ex. 4, Letter from Chairman Brendan Carr, FCC, to Ranking Member Yvette Clarke, House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, at 4 (May 29, 2026) (“Letter to Rep. Clarke”). Chairman Carr advised Disney of this investigation on March 27, 2025. See Ex. 5, Letter from Chairman Brendan Carr, FCC, to Chief Executive Officer Robert A. Iger, Disney (Mar. 27, 2025) (“March 2025 Letter”). The Chairman’s letter identified a number of public reports and allegations that prompted concern. See id. at 2 & nn.3, 5-10. Collectively, those sources suggested that Disney • “may have relied on race, gender, or other protected characteristics in making hiring and promotion decisions”; • “made compensation decisions based on race, gender, or other protected characteristics”; • “limited workplace opportunities to employees based on race, gender, or other protected characteristic[s]”; • “and/or made other decisions based on impermissibly discriminatory considerations.” - 8 - Case 1:26-cv-02902-LLA Document 23 Filed 09/03/26 Page 18 of 56 Ex. 4, Letter to Hon. Yvette Clarke at 4. “Other reports described affinity groups and programs that appeared to segregate employees on the basis of race or identity characteristics.” Id.; see Ex. 5, March 2025 Letter at 3 & n.4. The Enforcement Bureau issued its initial investigatory letter of inquiry to Disney on June 5, 2025. Ex. 4, Letter to Rep. Clarke at 4. In mid-June, Disney’s counsel contacted staff in the Bureau to request additional time to respond, and to seek to narrow the scope of the investigatory requests. See Ex. 26, E-mails Concerning First Letter of Inquiry, at 11-12 (attached) (e-mail from Disney’s outside counsel on June 18, 2025, at 20:14 ET).2 After engaging with Disney’s requests through the remainder of June and into early July, the Bureau informed Disney that, “[t]o expedite this process, and without waiving or prejudicing our ability to renew our demand” for a broader range of documents in the future, the Commission would extend various negotiated deadlines. Id. at 7-8 (email from FCC to Disney’s outside counsel on July 2, 2025, at 13:14 ET). When Disney’s response to the initial letter of inquiry did not resolve the Commission’s concerns of possible discrimination, the Bureau issued a supplemental letter of inquiry in February 2026. Ex. 4, Letter to Rep. Clarke at 4. After the Bureau extended Disney’s time to respond to that request, Disney responded on April 21, 2026. Id. That response, however, did not meet the agency’s expectations, and it raised “considerable concerns” for Commission staff. See Ex. 27, E- mail from Pamela Kane, FCC Enforcement Bureau, to Suzanne Tetreault, Outside Counsel for Disney, at 2 (May 15, 2026, at 12:52 ET) (attached); Letter to Rep. Clarke at 3. The staff 2 The Commission’s rules permit parties to submit materials to the agency with a request for confidential treatment. See 47 C.F.R. § 0.459. Exhibits 26 and 27 are redacted to protect information that Disney has asked the Commission to treat as confidential. Because the redacted material currently remains under seal before the agency, see id. § 0.459(d)(3), undersigned counsel is not authorized to make it public at this time. - 9 - Case 1:26-cv-02902-LLA Document 23 Filed 09/03/26 Page 19 of 56 memorialized these concerns in an eleven-page, single-spaced explanatory document, which it shared with Disney’s counsel on May 15, 2026. See Attachment, Ex. 27, at 3-13. III. The License Renewal Proceeding. A week after Disney’s deficient response to the Enforcement Bureau’s supplemental letter of inquiry, on April 28, 2026, the Media Bureau issued its order “calling in Disney’s ABC licenses for early renewal.” Wilkinson Ex. 41 (Dkt. 2-4), The Walt Disney Company, DA 26-416, ¶ 3 (Media Bur. Apr. 28, 2026) (“Early Renewal Order”). As of that date, the Commission had conducted “more than a year of investigative activity” related to the reports and allegations of discrimination at Disney, including through the Enforcement Bureau’s letters of inquiry. Ex. 4, Letter to Rep. Clarke at 5. But despite “ongoing engagement” with Disney concerning those requests, id., the Commission was not receiving information that staff required—including “documents on behalf of more than [the] Disney-owned broadcast stations,” Ex. 27, at 3; see id. at 3-13, which the Commission required to inform its investigation into the activities of the licensees. The Media Bureau accordingly called the stations’ licenses for early renewal, aiming to assist the agency’s investigation of possible unlawful discrimination. Wilkinson Ex. 41, Early Renewal Order ¶ 2. The stations filed their renewal applications on May 28, 2026, and the Media Bureau announced procedures governing their consideration the following day. See Wilkinson Ex. 45 (Dkt. 2-4), FCC’s Media Bureau Establishes Pleading Cycle and Ex Parte Procedures for the Early Renewal Applications of the Walt Disney Company’s ABC Licenses, DA 26-541 (May 29, 2026). Among other things, the Media Bureau established a docket in which the public could submit information relevant to the stations’ applications, and it established a pleading cycle under which petitions to deny were due “no later than June 29, 2026,” oppositions no later than July 29, and replies by August 5. See id. - 10 - Case 1:26-cv-02902-LLA Document 23 Filed 09/03/26 Page 20 of 56 The Commission received six pleadings styled as petitions to deny the applications in the renewal proceedings. See Compl. (Dkt. 1) ¶ 106 n.84 (citing FCC Electronic Comment Filing System, MB Docket No. 26-131, https://perma.cc/C36P-K9AN). Those submissions, in turn, generated lengthy oppositions—including from Disney—and replies. See, e.g., PI Mem. (Dkt. 2- 1) at 20 n.26 (citing Opposition of The Walt Disney Co. et al. to Petitions to Deny Renewals of Licenses, MB Dkt. No. 26-131 (July 29, 2026), https://perma.cc/SH7V-BNMZ). There were hundreds of other substantive filings, both in support of and against renewal, from a wide variety of parties—individual citizens, members of Congress, trade associations, unions, local governments, and public interest organizations from across the political spectrum. See generally MB Dkt. No. 26-131. As Plaintiffs recognize, the Commission also received over 150,000 “express” comments, largely in support of renewal.3 Compl. (Dkt. 1) ¶ 106. The New York Times and other media outlets have reported that the stations solicited these comments through commercials urging viewers to “tell the agency not to take away their ‘trusted local station’” and providing “a QR code that led viewers directly to the F.C.C. website.” Ex. 6, John Koblin, ABC Formally Rebukes F.C.C. for Review of TV Licenses, N.Y. TIMES, at 3 (July 30, 2026) (attached). The Commission is now in the process of reviewing and analyzing this voluminous record. As the Chairman has emphasized, although the “allegations and reports” of discrimination at Disney companies are “concerning,” they “do not represent FCC conclusions or determinations”; the agency is “reserving judgment on the issues” while assessing the evidence. Ex. 4, Letter to Rep. Clarke at 4; see also Ex. 1, Shepardson, at 3. 3 The FCC’s express-comment form allows members of the public to participate less formally in FCC proceedings by submitting “brief comments” directly into an online form. See Ex. 7, FCC, Submit an Express Comment (attached). - 11 - Case 1:26-cv-02902-LLA Document 23 Filed 09/03/26 Page 21 of 56 LEGAL STANDARDS I. Preliminary Injunctions under Winter. A preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. To obtain it, the movant must show that (1) “he is likely to succeed on the merits”; (2) “he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief”; (3) “the balance of equities tips in his favor”; and (4) “an injunction is in the public interest.” Id. The latter two factors “merge when the Government is the opposing party.” Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). The Supreme Court has held that at least the second factor—irreparable harm—must be likely and “not just a possibility.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 21. Before Winter, courts weighed these factors on a “sliding scale,” allowing “an unusually strong showing on one of the factors” to overcome a weaker showing on another. Damus v. Nielsen, 313 F. Supp. 3d 317, 326 (D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Davis v. Pension Ben. Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1291-92 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). The D.C. Circuit has not had occasion to conclusively decide whether that sliding scale survives Winter and Nken. Make the Road N.Y. v. Mullin, 179 F.4th 16, 25 (D.C. Cir. 2026). The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that “[t]he default rule is that a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must make a clear showing” as to each Winter element. Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney, 602 U.S. 339, 346 (2024); see also Sherley v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Winter “suggest[s] if not hold[s]” that each of the factors “is an ‘independent, free-standing requirement’”); Singh v. Carter, 185 F. Supp. 3d 11, 16-17 (D.D.C. 2016) (sliding scale approach is “highly questionable,” and a plaintiff “bears the burden of persuasion on all four preliminary injunction factors”). If a claim fails as a matter of law, on a point of jurisdiction or on the merits, a preliminary injunction is unwarranted. See, e.g., Food & Water Watch, Inc. v. Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905, 913 - 12 - Case 1:26-cv-02902-LLA Document 23 Filed 09/03/26 Page 22 of 56 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“inability to establish a substantial likelihood of standing requires denial of the motion for preliminary injunction”); see also Mullin v. Doe, 146 S. Ct. 2121, 2137 (Jun. 26, 2026). And if a court “concludes that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the complaint.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006). II. Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1). Under Rule 12(b)(1), a plaintiff bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). A court considering a Rule 12(b)(1) motion must “assume the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint and ‘construe the complaint liberally, granting plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.’” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 972 (D.C. Cir. 2005)). The standard for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), however, is “less forgiving” than under Rule 12(b)(6). Huang v. Wheeler, 215 F. Supp. 3d 100, 106 (D.D.C. 2016). Specifically, given a court’s “affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting within the scope of its jurisdictional authority,” “the [p]laintiff’s factual allegations in the complaint . . . will bear closer scrutiny in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion.” Id. at 107 (alterations in original; quoting Grand Lodge of Fraternal Order of Police v. Ashcroft, 185 F. Supp. 2d 9, 13 (D.D.C. 2001)). And when applying Rule 12(b)(1), courts “may consider material outside the pleadings,” including judicially noticeable agency materials. See Kareem v. Haspel, 986 F.3d 859, 866 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 2021). ARGUMENT Plaintiffs have failed to establish any of the requirements for preliminary relief. First, they fail to show that they are likely to succeed on the merits. Because they challenge the constitutionality of how the Commission is exercising (or may, in the future, exercise) its lawful powers under the Communications Act—they do not contend that the FCC is “unconstitutional in - 13 - Case 1:26-cv-02902-LLA Document 23 Filed 09/03/26 Page 23 of 56 much of [its] work”—this is not the kind of “extraordinary” case in which a district court may exercise jurisdiction outside the “ordinary statutory review scheme” for FCC orders. Axon Enter., Inc. v. FTC, 598 U.S. 175, 180 (2023). Nor have Plaintiffs established retaliation in violation of the First Amendment. The remaining equitable factors favor permitting the Commission to pursue its investigation to conclusion. The Court should therefore deny Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction and grant the Commission’s motion to dismiss the complaint. I. Plaintiffs Are Unlikely to Succeed on the Merits. Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits because this Court lacks jurisdiction over this dispute. Nor are Plaintiffs likely to prevail on the substance of their First Amendment claim. A. This Court Lacks Jurisdiction Because Congress Has Channeled Judicial Review of Commission Orders to the Courts of Appeals. 1. TRAC Forecloses Jurisdiction in District Court. Several interlocking statutory provisions establish the process for judicial review of Commission orders. Statutory interpretation “begins . . . with the text of the statute.” Chao v. Day, 436 F.3d 234, 235 (D.C. Cir. 2006). First, the Hobbs Act vests the “court of appeals” with “exclusive jurisdiction to enjoin, set aside, suspend (in whole or in part), or to determine the validity of . . . all final orders of the [Commission] made reviewable by section 402(a) of title 47.” 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1). Section 402(a), then, defines the Commission orders subject to Hobbs Act review in the court of appeals: “any order of the Commission under this chapter (except those appealable under [47 U.S.C. § 402(b)]).” 47 U.S.C. § 402(a). Section 402(b) of the Communications Act covers a specified list of orders concerning licenses. See id. § 402(b). For those orders (and certain ancillary orders), Section 402(b) provides for judicial review exclusively in the D.C. Circuit. Id. Under the plain reading of these provisions, therefore, “pre-enforcement” review of FCC orders—that is, judicial review before the order is applied against the challenger— - 14 - Case 1:26-cv-02902-LLA Document 23 Filed 09/03/26 Page 24 of 56 must be pressed in the federal courts of appeals. See McLaughlin Chiropractic Assocs. v. McKesson Corp., 606 U.S. 146, 152-53 (2025) (Hobbs Act); see also Wagner v. FEC, 717 F.3d 1007, 1012 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (per curiam) (Section 402(b) “confer[s] exclusive jurisdiction to review those actions on this court” (citing AT&T Corp. v. FCC, 220 F.3d 607, 615 (D.C. Cir. 2000)); FCC v. ITT World Commc’ns, Inc., 466 U.S. 463, 468 (1984) (“Exclusive jurisdiction for review of final FCC orders . . . lies in the Court of Appeals.”). In reference to these provisions, the D.C. Circuit has held that, “where a statute commits review of agency action to the Court of Appeals, any suit seeking relief that might affect the Circuit Court’s future jurisdiction is subject to the exclusive review of the Court of Appeals.” TRAC, 750 F.2d at 78-79; accord id. at 75 & n.26. Thus, even where there is not yet a “final” reviewable agency order, if allowing a claim to proceed in district court would deprive the court of appeals of its future jurisdiction under a claims-channeling statute like the Hobbs Act or Section 402(b), a district court lacks federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. See TRAC, 750 F.2d at 75 & n.26, 77; see also La Voz Radio de la Communidad v. FCC, 223 F.3d 313, 318 (6th Cir. 2000) (applying TRAC in a licensing case under Section 402(b)); Alter v. FCC, Civ. A. No. 24- 0745 (AHA), 2025 WL 1454377, at *2 (D.D.C. May 21, 2025) (district courts lack jurisdiction “no matter which of the two routes to judicial review [of FCC orders] applies”). As the Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, the mere fact that a special statutory review scheme requires parties to await the conclusion of an agency’s proceeding before judicial review becomes available does not mean district courts may side-step Congress’s jurisdictional design. See Axon, 598 U.S. at 192. That is true even when a party claims that a “protracted adjudicatory proceeding” will involve “expense and disruption.” Id. (quoting FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 449 U.S. 232, 244 (1980)). Specialized review schemes allow agencies “a heightened role in - 15 - Case 1:26-cv-02902-LLA Document 23 Filed 09/03/26 Page 25 of 56 matters [they] customarily handle[], and can apply distinctive knowledge to.” Id. at 186. And once an agency’s processes have run their course, exclusive review in the courts of appeals ensures “rapid, conclusive, and nationwide dispute resolution.” Nat’l Ass’n of Broad. v. FCC, 147 F.4th 978, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 2025). Specialized review schemes thus help avoid “delays and uncertainty that otherwise could ensue from multiple pre-enforcement suits filed across time in multiple district courts and from subsequent appeals in the courts of appeals.” McLaughlin, 606 U.S. at 153. And generally, “an agency’s subsidiary decisions merge into the final agency action, which is then subject to review.” Mullin, 146 S. Ct. at 2136 (plurality opinion). Here, the Commission has not yet issued any reviewable order as to Disney, ABC, or the stations. To be sure, Plaintiffs fear that the Commission might issue one that “den[ies] renewal or even revoke[s] [their] licenses.” PI Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 16; see id. also at 28, 32, 38; Compl. (Dkt. 1) ¶¶ 12, 114. But this only confirms that Plaintiffs are in the wrong tribunal. The statute is clear that action seeking to enjoin or otherwise block any such order is subject to exclusive review in the D.C. Circuit. See 47 U.S.C. § 402(b)(2), (5). In these circumstances, the Communications Act preserves the prospective jurisdiction of the court of appeals, and this Court lacks jurisdiction. See TRAC, 750 F.2d at 75. To accept any other conclusion “encourages forum shopping and encourages dissatisfied claimants to ‘jump the gun’ by going directly to the district court to develop their case instead of exhausting their administrative remedies before the agency.” Doe v. DEA, 484 F.3d 561, 570 (D.C. Cir. 2007). “Moreover, it encourages duplicative and potentially conflicting review, and the delay and expense incidental thereto.” Id. (citation modified). The D.C. Circuit has closed that door. TRAC, 750 F.2d at 74-79. Plaintiffs profess concern that “the Commission may intentionally prolong the adjudicative process, miring ABC in years of costly litigation, with the threat of adverse action ever present.” - 16 - Case 1:26-cv-02902-LLA Document 23 Filed 09/03/26 Page 26 of 56 Compl. (Dkt. 1) ¶ 12; see PI Mem. (Dkt. 2-1) at 49. But special review schemes routinely and permissibly “require parties to wait before appealing,” and thus “‘the expense and disruption’ of ‘protracted adjudicatory proceedings’ . . . do not justify immediate review.” Axon, 598 U.S. at 192. And if agency action is unreasonably delayed, Plaintiffs are not without recourse. As TRAC provides, see 750 F.2d at 77-78, a party may pursue relief from any undue delay under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), by seeking a writ of mandamus or writ of prohibition, see In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 179 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (these writs are “counterparts”), overruled on other grounds by Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 31 (1984). 2. The Narrow Path Courts Have Allowed for Judicial Review Outside Claims-Channeling Statutes Does Not Apply. “[O]rdinary statutory review” will “not preclude a district court from entertaining” certain “extraordinary claims”: those that encompass “fundamental, even existential” challenges that “an agency is wielding authority unconstitutionally in all or a broad swath of its work.” Axon, 598 U.S. at 180, 189. This narrow exception to ordinary claims channeling does not mean every claim of unconstitutional agency action is reviewable in district court. Numerous cases recognize, for example, that claims challenging “the manner in which [an] agency has exercised or . . . failed to exercise” its statutory authority—unlike claims challenging the constitutionality of the underlying federal statute—may not be reviewed in district court. Time Warner Ent. Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1996)); see also Bland v. Blanche, Civ. A. No. 25-3499 (APM), 2026 WL 1998552, at *5 (D.D.C. July 10, 2026) (recognizing this distinction, and applying TRAC, not Axon, to separation-of-powers and bias claims); Bold Alliance v. FERC, Civ. A. No. 17-1822 (RJL), 2018 WL 4681004, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 2018) (no exception to TRAC where “constitutional theories go to [agency’s] practice of adjudicating claims—not to its power to do so”). - 17 - Case 1:26-cv-02902-LLA Document 23 Filed 09/03/26 Page 27 of 56 At a “30,000-foot” level, the Court in Axon explained that whether district court review is available involves grouping a plaintiff’s claims into one of two categories. 598 U.S. at 188-89. Claims “of the type” that “Congress thought belonged within a statutory [review] scheme” involve challenges to an agency’s “specific substantive decision” or “the commonplace procedures agencies use to make such a decision.” Id. at 189. On the other hand, claims challenging “the core of [an agency’s] existence” or “structure” are immediately reviewable because such claims “protest the ‘here-and-now’ injury of subjection to an unconstitutionally structured decisionmaking process.” Id. at 189, 192. That sort of injury is inflicted “irrespective of [the proceeding’s] outcome, or of other decisions made within it.” Id. at 192. Not so here. Plaintiffs’ claim rather fits into the first category, to which claims channeling applies. Plaintiffs do not contend that the Commission is unconstitutionally structured; challenge the legality of the agency’s existence; or deny that the Commission may lawfully investigate broadcasters and seek to ensure they serve the public interest and comply with the communications laws. Instead, Plaintiffs complain that the Commission is exercising its lawful authority to unlawfully retaliate against them for their constitutionally protected expression. This case is thus unlike Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Board, 561 U.S. 477 (2010), where “the complaint alleged that the Board’s ‘freedom from Presidential oversight’ rendered unconstitutional ‘all power and authority [that the Board] exercised,” Axon, 598 U.S. at 189 (alteration in original; quoting Free Enter. Fund, 561 U.S. at 508). Rather, this case aligns with Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994), and Elgin v. Dep’t of Treasury, 567 U.S. 1 (2012), which involved “‘threshold’ and other ‘questions’” that were “squarely within the [agencies’] expertise,” Axon, 598 U.S. at 187. To resolve Plaintiffs’ claim that the Commission used the early renewal process for an improper purpose, this Court necessarily - 18 - Case 1:26-cv-02902-LLA Document 23 Filed 09/03/26 Page 28 of 56 must understand details about broadcast licensing, the public interest obligations of broadcasters under the Communications Act, and the Commission’s rules. More importantly, the Court would be required to delve deeply into the antidiscrimination investigation that was the impetus for the early license renewal process. Legal and factual questions of that kind implicate the Commission’s expertise concerning the governing statutory and regulatory framework. Likewise, a correct application of